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Abstract. The counterfeit coin problem requires us to find all false coins from a given bunch of
coins using a balance scale. We assume that the balance scale gives us only “balanced” or “tilted”
information and that we know the number k of false coins in advance. The balance scale can be
modeled by a certain type of oracle and its query complexity is a measure for the cost of weighing
algorithms (the number of weighings). In this paper, we study the quantum query complexity for
this problem. Let Q(k,N) be the quantum query complexity of finding all k false coins from the
N given coins. We show that for any k and N such that k < N/2, Q(k,N) = O(k1/4), contrasting
with the classical query complexity, Ω(k log(N/k)), that depends on N . So our quantum algorithm
achieves a quartic speed-up for this problem. We do not have a matching lower bound, but we
show some evidence that the upper bound is tight: any algorithm, including our algorithm, that
satisfies certain properties needs Ω(k1/4) queries.
1 Introduction
Exponential speed-ups by quantum algorithms have been highly celebrated, but their specific ex-
amples are not too many. In contrast, almost every unstructured search problem can be sped
up simply by using amplitude amplification [8, 5, 6], providing a huge number of combinatorial
problems for which quantum algorithms are quadratically faster than classical ones. Interestingly
there are few examples in between. (For instance, [7] provides a cubic speed-up while their classical
lower bound is not known.) The reason is probably that the amplitude amplification is too general
to combine with other methods appropriately. In fact we know few such cases including the one
by [14] where they improved a simple Grover search algorithm for triangle finding by using clever
combinatorial ideas (but unfortunately still less than quadratically compared to the best classical
algorithm). This paper achieves a quartic speed-up for a well-known combinatorial problem.
The counterfeit coin problem is a mathematical puzzle whose origin dates back to 1945; in
the American Mathematical Monthly, 52, p. 46, E. Schell posed the following question which is
probably one of the oldest questions about the complexity of algorithms: “You have eight similar
coins and a beam balance. At most one coin is counterfeit and hence underweight. How can you
detect whether there is an underweight coin, and if so, which one, using the balance only twice?”
The puzzle immediately fascinated many people and since then there have been several different
versions and extensions in the literature (see e.g., [15, 9, 10, 13]).
This paper considers the quantum version of this problem, which, a bit surprisingly, has not
appeared in the literature. To make our model simple, we assume that we cannot obtain informa-
tion on which side is heavier when the scale is tilted. So, the balance scale gives us only binary
information, balanced (i.e., two sets of coins on the two pans are equal in weight) or tilted (different
in weight). Our goal is to detect the false coin with a minimum number of weighings. The problem
is naturally extended to the case that there are two or more (= k that is known in advance) false
coins with equal weight. For the simplest case that k = 1, the following easy (classic) algorithm
exists: We put (approximately) N/4 coins on both pans. If the scale is tilted, then we know the
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false coin is in those N/2 coins and if it is balanced, then the false one should be in the remaining
N/2 ones. Also, it is easy to see that two weighings are enough for N = 4. Thus ⌈logN⌉ weighings
are enough for k = 1 and this is also an information theoretic lower bound. (The original version of
the problem assumes ternary outputs from the balance, left-heavy, right-heavy and balanced, and
that the false coin is always underweight. As one can see easily, however, the same idea allows us
to obtain the tight upper bound of ⌈log3N⌉.)
Our model of a balance scale is a so-called oracle. A balance oracle or simply a B-oracle is
an N -bit register, which includes (originally unknown) N bits, x1x2 · · · xN ∈ {0, 1}N . In order to
retrieve these values, we can make a query with a query string q1q2 · · · qN ∈ {0, 1,−1}N including
the same number (= l) of 1’s and −1’s. Then the oracle returns a one-bit answer χ defined as:
χ = 0 if x1q1 + · · ·+ xNqN = 0 and χ = 1 otherwise.
Consider x1, · · · , xN as N coins where 0 means a fair coin and 1 a false one. Then, qi = 1 means we
place coin xi on the left pan and qi = −1 on the right pan. Since we must have the same number
of 1’s and −1’s, the answer χ correctly simulates the balance scale, i.e., χ = 0 means it is balanced
and χ = 1 tilted. The number of weighings needed to retrieve x1 through xN (or to identify all the
false coins) is called query complexity.
The main purpose of this paper is to obtain quantum query complexity for the counterfeit coin
problems. Observe that if we know in advance that an even-cardinality set X includes at most one
false coin, then by using the balance for any equal-size partition of X we can get the parity of X,
i.e., the parity of the number (zero or one, now) of false coins in X. This means that for strings
including at most one 1, the B-oracle is equivalent to the so-called IP oracle [4]. Therefore, by
Bernstein-Vazirani algorithm [4], we need only one weighing to detect the false coin. (Note that
this observation was essentially done by Terhal and Smolin [19].) This already allows us to design
the following quantum algorithm for general k: Recall that we know k in advance. So, if we sample
N/k coins at random, then they include exactly one false coin with high probability and we can
find it using the B-oracle just once as mentioned above. Thus, by using the standard amplitude
amplification [6] (together with a bit careful consideration for the answer-confirmation procedure),
we need O(k) weighings to find all k false coins. For a small k, this is already much better than
Ω(k log(N/k)) that is an information theoretic lower bound for the classical case.
Our Contribution. This paper shows that this complexity can be furthermore improved
quartically, namely, our new algorithm needs O(k1/4) weighings. Note that the above idea, the one
exploiting Bernstein-Vazirani, already breaks down for k = 2, since the scale tilts even if the pans
hold two (even) false coins if they both go to a same pan. Moreover, if k grows, say as large as linear
in N , the balance will be tilted almost always for randomly selected equal partitions. Nevertheless,
Bernstein-Vazirani is useful since it essentially reduces our problem (identifying false coins) to the
problem of deciding the parity of the number of the false coins that turns out to be an easier task
for B-oracles. By this we can get a single quadratic speed-up and another quadratic speed-up by
amplitude amplification.
We conjecture that this bound is tight, but unfortunately, we cannot prove it at this moment.
The main difficulty is that we have a lot of freedom on “the size of the pans” (= the number of
coins placed on the two pans of the scale), which makes it hard to design a single weight scheme of
the adversary method [1]. However, we do have a proof claiming that we cannot do better unless
we can remove the two fundamental properties of our algorithm. These properties are (i) the big-
pan property and (ii) the random-partition property. We have considered several possibilities for
escaping from them, but not successful for even one of them.
Related Work. Query complexities have been studied almost always for the standard index
oracle, which accepts an index i and returns the value of xi. Other than this oracle, we know few
ones including the IP oracle [4] mentioned before and the even more powerful one that returns
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the number (not the parity) of 1’s in the string [19]. Also, [19] presented a single-query quantum
algorithm for the binary search problem under the IP oracle, which is essentially based on the same
idea as the k = 1 case of our problem mentioned above.
The quantum adversary method, which is used for B-oracles in this paper, was first introduced
by Ambainis [1] for the standard oracle. Many variants have followed including weighted adversary
methods [2, 20], spectral adversary method [3], Kolmogorov complexity method [12], all of which
were shown to be equivalent [18]. After Høyer et al. [11] introduced a stronger quantum adver-
sary method called the negative adversary method, Reichardt [16, 17] showed that this method is
“optimal” for any Boolean function.
Models. A B-oracle is a binary string x = x1 · · · xN where xi = 1 (resp. = 0) means that the
i-th coin is false (resp. fair). For instance, the string 0001 for N = 4 means that the fourth coin is a
unique false coin. A query to the oracle is given as a string q = q1 · · · qN ∈ {0, 1,−1}N that must be
in the set Q(B) =
⋃⌊N/2⌋
l=0 Ql where Ql is the set of strings q such that q has exactly l 1’s and l −1’s.
Here, 1 (or −1, resp.) in the i-th component means that we place the i-th coin on the left pan (on
the right pan, resp.) and 0 means that the i-th coin is not placed on either pan. The answer from
the oracle is represented by a binary value χ(x; q) where χ(x; q) = 0 means the scale is balanced,
that is, q1x1 + . . . + qNxN = 0 and χ(x; q) = 1 means it is tilted, that is, q1x1 + . . . + qNxN 6= 0.
In quantum computation, the B-oracle is viewed as a unitary transformation OB,x. Namely, OB,x
transforms |q〉 to (−1)χ(x;q)|q〉. Throughout this paper, we assume that k < N/2 since our B-oracle
model is unable to distinguish any N -bit string x from x¯ (the bit string obtained by flipping all
bits of x).
2 Upper Bounds
Here is our main result in this paper:
Theorem 1 The quantum query complexity for finding k false coins among N coins is O(k1/4).
Notice that our algorithm is exact, i.e., its output must be correct with probability one to
compare our result with the classical case (which has been often studied in the exact setting).
Since we use exact amplitude amplification [6] to make our algorithm exact, the assumption that k
is known is necessary. But it should be noted that our bounded-error algorithm described in this
section works even for unknown k. Also, we note that our algorithm can be easily adapted so that
it works when the output of the balance is ternary (while we assume it is binary for simplicity).
Before the proof, we first describe our basic approach, a simulation of the IP oracle by the
B-oracle. Recall that the IP oracle (Inner Product oracle) [4] transforms a prequery state |q˜〉R to
(−1)q˜·x|q˜〉R, where q˜ ∈ {0, 1}N in register R is a query string and x ∈ {0, 1}N is an oracle. Then the
Bernstein-Vazirani algorithm (the Hadamard transform) retrieves the string x and we know the k
false coins in the case of our problem. Observe that the IP oracle flips the phase of each state if
and only if q˜ · x is odd, in other words, if and only if a multiset M(q˜, x) := {xi | q˜i = 1} includes
an odd number of 1’s (or false coins in our case). If k = 1, then M(q˜, x) includes at most one 1.
Hence we can simply replace the IP oracle with the query sequence q˜ by the B-oracle with a query
sequence q such that an arbitrarily one half (the first one half, for instance) of the 1’s in q˜ are
changed to −1’s, meaning the one half of the coins in M(q˜, x) go to the left pan and the remaining
one half to the right pan. (As shown in a moment, we can assume without loss of generality that
q˜ includes an even number of 1’s.)
Now we consider the general (k ≥ 1) case. If M(q˜, x) includes odd 1’s, then the scale is tilted
for any such q mentioned above; this is desirable for us. If M(q˜, x) includes even 1’s, we wish the
scale to be balanced. In order for this to happen, however, we must divide the (unknown) false
coins in M(q˜, x) into the two pans evenly, for which there are no obvious ways other than using
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randomization. Our idea is to introduce the second register, R′, as follows: On R′, we prepare, with
being entangled to each state q˜ in R, a superposition of all possible states q1(q˜), q2(q˜), . . . , qh(q˜),
obtained by flipping one half of 1’s in q˜ into −1’s. By using this superposition as a query to the
B-oracle, we can achieve a success (being able to detect the scale is balanced) probability of 1/
√
m,
where m is the number of false coins in M(q˜, x). In order to increase this probability, we can use
copies of register R′ or, more efficiently, quantum amplitude amplification [6].
As suggested before, we begin with the restriction of the IP oracle without losing its power.
The parity-restricted query means that the Hamming weights of all superposed queries q˜, denoted
by wt(q˜), are even.
Lemma 1 Let S<N/2 := {x ∈ {0, 1}N | wt(x) < N/2}. Then there is a quantum algorithm to
identify an oracle in S<N/2 by a single parity-restricted query for the IP oracle.
Proof. For a given oracle x ∈ S<N/2, define
|ψx〉 = 1√
2N−1
∑
q˜∈Qeven
(−1)q˜·x|q˜〉.
where Qeven = {q˜ ∈ {0, 1}N | wt(q˜) = 0 mod 2}. Then the Hadamard transform of |ψx〉, H|ψx〉,
can be rewritten as follows:
H|ψx〉 = 1√
2N−1
∑
q˜∈Qeven
(−1)q˜·xH|q˜〉 = 1
2N−1
√
2
∑
q˜∈Qeven
∑
z∈{0,1}N
(−1)q˜·(x⊕z)|z〉
=
1√
2
(|x〉+ |x¯〉) + 1
2N−1
√
2
∑
q˜∈Qeven
∑
z 6=x,x¯
(−1)q˜·(x⊕z)|z〉
=
1√
2
(|x〉+ |x¯〉) .
Note that the last equality in the above equations holds; the second term must vanish because
the first term already has a unit length. For any x 6= y, H|ψx〉 = (|x〉 + |x¯〉)/
√
2 and H|ψy〉 =
(|y〉 + |y¯〉)/√2 are orthogonal since x 6= y¯ by the restriction of their Hamming weights. This
implies that |ψx〉 is orthogonal to |ψy〉 for any x 6= y, and hence there is a unitary transformation
W : |x〉 7→ |ψx〉. Thus we can design an algorithm similar to Bernstein-Vazirani [4] just replacing
the Hadamard transform by W . For a concrete (polynomial-time) construction of W, see Appendix
A.
Now we give the proof of our main result.
Proof of Theorem 1. For exposition, we first give a bounded-error algorithm (Find∗(k)) and
then make it exact (Find(k)). In what follows, for a query string q˜, let I(q˜) be the set of indices
i such that q˜i = 1. This set specifies which wt(q˜) coins of the N coins are placed on the two pans.
Let PI(q˜) be the set of all partitions of the set I(q˜) of size wt(q˜) (= even by Lemma 1) into two sets
of size wt(q˜)/2. Note that each partition (Y, Y ) in PI(q˜) specifies how to split the wt(q˜) coins in
half to place them on the left and right pans, and can be identified with the corresponding query
q to the B-oracle. Finally, let χ(Y, Y ) be the answer for the query (Y, Y ) ∈ PI(q˜) to the B-oracle.
Algorithm Find∗(k).
1. Prepare N qubits |0〉⊗N in a register R, and apply a unitary transformation W of Lemma 1
to them. Then, we have the state 1√
2N−1
∑
q˜∈Qeven |q˜〉R.
2. For each superposed q˜, implement Steps 2.1–2.4 on a register R′ using q˜ as a control part.
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2.1. Apply a unitary transformationAq˜ to the initial state |0〉 on R′ to create a quantum state
Aq˜|0〉 := 1√|PI(q˜)|
∑
(Y,Y )∈PI(q˜) |Y, Y 〉R′ , which represents a uniform superposition of all partitions
(Y, Y ) in PI(q˜). Then, the current state is
|ξ2,1〉 =
∑
q˜∈Qeven
|q˜〉R
∑
(Y,Y )∈PI(q˜)
γα|Y, Y 〉R′
=
∑
q˜∈Qeven∩Qe
|q˜〉R
∑
(Y,Y )∈PI(q˜)
γα|Y, Y 〉R′ +
∑
q˜∈Qeven∩Qo
|q˜〉R
∑
(Y,Y )∈PI(q˜)
γα|Y, Y 〉R′
where Qe (resp. Qo) denotes the set of all q˜’s such thatM(q˜, x) includes an even (resp. odd) number
of 1’s. Also, γ = 1/
√
2N−1 and α = 1/
√
|PI(q˜)|.
2.2. Let χ be the Boolean function defined by χ(Y, Y ) = 1 if and only if χ(Y, Y ) = 0 (that is,
the scale is balanced). Then, under the above Aq˜ and χ, run the amplitude amplification algorithm
QSearch(Aq˜, χ) when the initial success probability of Aq˜ is unknown (Theorem 3 in [6]). Here
“success” means the scale is balanced and hence we use χ, not χ, in QSearch. Then we obtain a
state in the form of
|ξ2,2〉 =
∑
q˜∈Qeven∩Qe
|q˜〉R
∑
(Y,Y )∈PI(q˜)
γβY |Y, Y , gY 〉R′ +
∑
q˜∈Qeven∩Qo
|q˜〉R
∑
(Y,Y )∈PI(q˜)
γα|Y, Y , gY 〉R′
where |gY 〉 is the garbage state. Note that, in the first term, the amplitudes βY such that χ(Y, Y ) =
1 are now large by amplitude amplification while the second term does not change since the scale
is always tilted.
2.3. If Step 2.2 finds a “solution,” i.e., a partition (Y, Y ) such that χ(Y, Y ) = 1, then do
nothing. Otherwise, flip the phase (and then the phase is kick-backed into R). Notice that when
M(q˜, x) includes an odd number of 1’s, the phase is always flipped, while when it includes an even
number of 1’s, the phase is not flipped with high amplitude. Now the current state is
|ξ2,3〉 =
∑
q˜∈Qeven∩Qe
|q˜〉R
∑
(Y,Y )∈PI(q˜)
γβY (−1)χ(Y,Y )|Y, Y , gY 〉R′ −
∑
q˜∈Qeven∩Qo
|q˜〉R
∑
(Y,Y )∈PI(q˜)
γα|Y, Y , gY 〉R′
=
∑
q˜∈Qeven∩Qe
|q˜〉R
∑
(Y,Y )∈PI(q˜)
γβY |Y, Y , gY 〉R′ −
∑
q˜∈Qeven∩Qo
|q˜〉R
∑
(Y,Y )∈PI(q˜)
γα|Y, Y , gY 〉R′ − 2
∑
q˜∈Qeven∩Qe
|q˜〉R|errq˜〉R′
where |errq˜〉R′ =
∑
(Y,Y )∈PI(q˜):χ(Y,Y )=1 γβY |Y, Y , gY 〉R′ .
2.4. Reverse the quantum transformation done in Steps 2.1 and 2.2. Notice that the
reversible transformation is done on R′ in parallel for each q˜ while the contents of R does not
change since it is the control part. Therefore, the state becomes
|ξ2,4〉 = 1√
2N−1
∑
q˜∈Qeven∩Qe
|q˜〉R|0〉R′ − 1√
2N−1
∑
q˜∈Qeven∩Qo
|q˜〉R|0〉R′ − 2
∑
q˜∈Qeven∩Qe
|q˜〉R|err′q˜〉R′
=
1√
2N−1
∑
q˜∈Qeven
(−1)q˜·x|q˜〉R|0〉R′ − 2
∑
q˜∈Qeven∩Qe
|q˜〉R|err′q˜〉R′
where |err′q˜〉R′ is the transformed state of |errq˜〉R′ .
3. Apply W−1 to the state in R. Then we obtain a final state
|ξ3〉 = |x〉R|0〉R′ − 2W−1
 ∑
q˜∈Qeven∩Qe
|q˜〉R|err′q˜〉R′
 .
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Then measure R in the computational basis. (End of Algorithm)
For justifying the correctness of Find∗(k), it suffices to show that the squared magnitude of the
second term of |ξ3〉 is a small constant, say, 1/400, since we then measure the desired value x with
probability at least 9/10 (in fact, at least (1 −√1/400)2 > 9/10). By the unitarity, its squared
magnitude is equal to that of the last term of |ξ2,3〉, that is, we want to evaluate the following
value ǫ.
ǫ := 4
∥∥∥∥∥∥
∑
q˜∈Qeven∩Qe
|q˜〉R|errq˜〉R′
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
= 4
∑
q˜∈Qeven∩Qe
|q˜〉R
∥∥|errq˜〉R′∥∥2 .
Lemma 2 ǫ is at most 1/400.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary q˜ in Qeven ∩ Qe. When M(q˜, x) includes m (≤ k) 1’s (where m is
even), the state Aq˜|0〉 includes a partition (Y, Y ) such that χ(Y, Y ) = 1 with probability at least
p =
( m
m/2
)( wt(q˜)−m
(wt(q˜)−m)/2
)
( wt(q˜)
wt(q˜)/2
) = Ω(1/√m) = Ω(1/√k).
By Theorem 3 in [6], it is guaranteed that, in the algorithm QSearch(Aq˜, χ), an expected number
of applications of the Grover-like subroutine to find a “solution,” i.e., a partition (Y, Y ) such that
χ(Y, Y ) = 1, is bounded by O(1/
√
p) = O(k1/4). The subroutine consists of (i) Aq˜, (ii) its inverse,
(iii) the transformation Oχ defined by Oχ|Y, Y 〉 = (−1)χ(Y,Y )|Y, Y 〉, and (iv) the transformation U0
defined by U0|z〉 = |z〉 if z 6= 0 and −|z〉 if z = 0, where Aq˜ (and hence its inverse) and U0
can be implemented without any query to the B-oracle, and Oχ can be implemented with one
query to the B-oracle. Thus the expected number of queries to find a “solution” is O(k1/4).
By setting the number of applications of the subroutine to c0k
1/4 where c0 is a large constant,
Step 2.2 finds a “solution” with probability at least 1599/1600. This means that for any q˜ ∈
Qeven ∩Qe,
∑
(Y,Y )∈PI(q˜):χ(Y,Y )=0 βY |Y, Y , gY 〉R′ has squared magnitude at most 1/1600. Recalling
γ = 1/
√
2N−1 we have
ǫ = 4γ2
∑
q˜∈Qeven∩Qe
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
∑
(Y,Y )∈PI(q˜):χ(Y,Y )=0
βY |Y, Y , gY 〉R′
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤ 1/400.
This completes the proof of Lemma 2.
Finally, it is easy to see from the above proof that the query complexity of Find∗(k) is O(k1/4)
since it makes O(k1/4) queries in Step 2 and no queries in Steps 1 and 3.
Now we consider the exact algorithm Find(k). By the symmetric structure of algorithm
Find∗(k), the success probability of identifying x correctly is independent of x (recall that the
oracle candidates are
(N
k
)
N -bit strings x with Hamming weight k). Thus we can use the so-called
exact amplitude amplification algorithm (Theorem 4 in [6]) to convert it into the exact algorithm.
Here is the brief description of Find(k). (see Appendix B for the details). First, we implement
Find∗(k). As shown above, Find∗(k) produces the correct output (i.e., k false coins) with a constant
probability (≥ 9/10) larger than 1/4. Notice that we can make the success probability exactly 1/4
by an appropriate adjustment. We need an algorithm for checking if the output is correct to amplify
the success probability to 1. Namely, an algorithm Check needs to judge whether k coins are indeed
all false, which can be implemented classically in O(log k) weighings (as seen in Appendix B). Then
we can implement the exact amplitude amplification: Like the 1/4-Grover’s algorithm [5], flip the
phase if Check judges that the output is correct, and apply the reflection about the state obtained
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after Find∗(k). It is not difficult to see that Find(k) always finds k false coins and the total
complexity is O(k1/4). Therefore, the proof of Theorem 1 is completed. 2
3 Lower Bounds
3.1 Basic Ideas
In this section, we discuss the lower bound of finding k false coins from N coins. We conjecture
that the upper bound O(k1/4) is tight but, unfortunately, we have not been able to show whether
it is true or not. Instead, we show that if there would be an algorithm that improves the upper
bound essentially, then it would have a completely different structure from our algorithm.
Before describing our results, we observe two properties of our algorithm Find(k). First,
Find(k) essentially uses only “big pans,” i.e., it always places at least Ω(N) coins on the pans,
which is called the big-pan property. (The algorithm Find∗(k) in Section 2 uses “small pans” but
it can be adapted with no essential change so that it works even if the size of pans must be big, as
easily shown in Appendix B.) Second, the B-oracle is always used in such a way that once the coins
placed on the two pans are determined, the partition of them into the two pans is done uniformly
at random, which is called the random-partition property. What we show in this section is that the
current upper bound is best achievable for any algorithm that satisfies at least one of these two
properties.
For this purpose, we revisit one version of the (nonnegative) quantum adversary method, called
the strong weighted adversary method in [18], due to Zhang [20]. Let f be a function from a finite
set S to another finite set S′. Recall that in a query complexity model, an input x ∈ S is given as an
oracle. An algorithm A would like to compute f(x) while it can obtain the information about x by
a unitary transformation Ox|q, a, z〉 = |q, a⊕ ζ(x; q), z〉, where |q〉 is the register for a query string
q from a finite set Q, |a〉 is the register for the binary answer ζ(x; q), a function from S × Q to
{0, 1}, and |z〉 is the work register. Note that the adversary method usually assumes the so-called
index oracle, namely q is an integer 1 ≤ i ≤ N and ζ(x; q) is the ith bit (0 or 1) of x ∈ {0, 1}N .
However, one can easily see that the above generalization to ζ(x; q) requires no essential changes
for its proof. Thus Theorem 14 of [20] can be restated as follows:
Lemma 3 Let w,w′ denote a weight scheme as follows:
1. Every pair (x, y) ∈ S × S is assigned a nonnegative weight w(x, y) = w(y, x) that satisfies
w(x, y) = 0 whenever f(x) = f(y).
2. Every triple (x, y, q) ∈ S × S × Q is assigned a nonnegative weight w′(x, y, q) that satisfies
w′(x, y, q) = 0 whenever ζ(x; q) = ζ(y; q) or f(x) = f(y), and w′(x, y, q)w′(y, x, q) ≥ w2(x, y)
for all x, y, q such that ζ(x; q) 6= ζ(y; q) and f(x) 6= f(y).
For all x, q, let µ(x) =
∑
y w(x, y) and ν(x, q) =
∑
y w
′(x, y, q). Then, the quantum query complex-
ity of f is at least
Ω
max
w,w′
min
x,y,q: w(x,y)>0,
ζ(x;q)6=ζ(y;q)
√
µ(x)µ(y)
ν(x, q)ν(y, q)
 .
3.2 Big Pan Lower Bounds
First, we show that our upper bound is tight under the big-pan property. In what follows, L ≥ l
denotes the restriction that at least l coins must be placed on the pans whenever the balance is
used.
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Theorem 2 If L ≥ l, we need Ω((lk/N)1/4) weighings to find k false coins. In particular, Ω(k1/4)
weighings are necessary if there is some constant c such that L ≥ N/c.
Proof. Let l = N/d. Then the lower bound we should show is Ω((k/d)1/4). We can assume that
d ≤ k/3 (otherwise, the lower bound becomes trivial). To use Lemma 3, let S = {x ∈ {0, 1}N |
wt(x) = k}, Q = Q≥N/d :=
⋃
l≥N/dQl, ζ(x; q) = χ(x; q), and f(x) = x. Our weight scheme is as
follows: Let w(x, y) = 1 for any pair (x, y) ∈ S × S such that x 6= y, and let w′(x, y, q) = 1 for all
(x, y, q) ∈ S×S×Q≥N/d such that χ(x; q) 6= χ(y; q) and x 6= y. It is easy to check that this satisfies
the condition of a weight scheme. Then, for any x, we have µ(x) =
∑
y w(x, y) =
(N
k
)− 1. We need
to evaluate ν(x, q)ν(y, q) for pairs (x, y) such that χ(x; q) = 1 and χ(y; q) = 0 or χ(x; q) = 0 and
χ(y; q) = 1. Fix q ∈ Q≥N/d arbitrarily and assume that q ∈ QN/c where c ≤ d. When χ(x; q) = 1
(i.e., the scale is tilted for query q when x is the input), notice that ν(x, q) =
∑
y w
′(x, y, q) is the
number of all y’s such that the scale is balanced when N/c coins are placed on each of the two pans
according to q. Therefore, by summing up all the cases such that those N/c coins include m false
ones,
ν(x, q) = γ(N, k, c) :=
k/2∑
m=0
(
N/c
m
)2((1− 2/c)N
k − 2m
)
.
Since χ(y; q) = 0, we have ν(y, q) =
∑
xw
′(x, y, q) =
(N
k
)− γ(N, k, c) by counting all x’s such that
the scale is titled. Then the product ν(x, q)ν(y, q) is γ(N, k, c)
((
N
k
)− γ(N, k, c)). Similarly, when
χ(x; q) = 1 we can see that the product is also γ(N, k, c)
((N
k
)− γ(N, k, c)). By Lemma 3 the
quantum query complexity of our problem is at least
Ω
 min
c: c≤d
√√√√ ((Nk )− 1)2
γ(N, k, c)(
(
N
k
)− γ(N, k, c))
 = Ω
 min
c: c≤d
√ (
N
k
)
γ(N, k, c)
 . (1)
Then, we can show the following lemma.
Lemma 4 γ(N, k, c)/
(N
k
)
= O(
√
c/k) for any 2 ≤ c ≤ d (≤ k/3).
Proof. Note that γ(N, k, c)/
(N
k
)
means the probability that the scale is balanced when N/c coins
(N coins include k false ones) are randomly placed on each of the two pans, and hence its value
decreases as c approaches to 2. So, it suffices to prove the lemma for c ≥ 4.
Let us denote each term in the sum γ(N, k, c) by t(m) =
(N/c
m
)2((1−2/c)N
k−2m
)
for m = 0, 1, . . . , k/2.
We divide γ(N, k, c) into the two parts, that is, we write γ(N, k, c) = T>k/2c + T≤k/2c where
T>k/2c =
∑
m:m>k/2c t(m) and T≤k/2c =
∑
m:m≤k/2c t(m). For the proof, it suffices to show that
both T>k/2c/
(N
k
)
and T≤k/2c/
(N
k
)
are bounded by O(
√
c/k). First we consider T>k/2c/
(N
k
)
. When
N/c coins are randomly placed on each of the pans, let E1 be the event that at least k/2c false
coins are placed on the pans, and E2 be the event that the scale is balanced. Then, we can see
that T>k/2c/
(N
k
)
= Pr[E1 ∧ E2] which is at most Pr[E2|E1] = O(1/
√
k/c) = O(
√
c/k). Second we
consider T≤k/2c/
(N
k
)
. Let r(m) = t(m + 1)/t(m). Note that r(m) is monotone decreasing on m
since
r(m) =
(N/c
m+1
)2( (1−2/c)N
k−2(m+1)
)
(N/c
m
)2((1−2/c)N
k−2m
)
=
(Nc −m)2(k − 2m)(k − 2m− 1)
(m+ 1)2((1− 2/c)N − k + 2m+ 1)((1 − 2/c)N − k + 2m+ 2) .
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Now we verify that r(k/2c− 1) > 4. In fact, since c ≤ k/3 < 2 + k/2, we have
(1− 2/c)N − k + k/c < (1− 2/c)(N − k/2− c) (2)
and
k − k/c− 3 ≥ k(1− 2/c). (3)
Thus we obtain
r(k/2c− 1) = (1/c)
2(N − k/2 − c)2(k − k/c − 2)(k − k/c− 3)
(k/2c)2((1− 2/c)N − k + k/c)((1 − 2/c)N − k + k/c − 1)
>
4(k − k/c− 2)(k − k/c− 3)
k2(1− 2/c)2 (by Eq.(2))
≥ 4 (by Eq.(3)).
These facts imply that
T≤k/2c =
∑
m:m≤k/2c
t(m) <
(
1 + 1/4 + (1/4)2 + · · · ) t(k/2c) = (4/3)t(k/2c),
which is bounded by (4/3)t(k/c) since t(m) takes the maximum value when m = k/c. Calculating
t(k/c)/
(
N
k
)
using the Stirling formula n! ∼ √2πn(N/e)N , we obtain
t(k/c)(N
k
) = (N/ck/c)2((1−2/c)N(1−2/c)k )(N
k
) = k!((kc )!)2((1− 2c )k)! · (N−k)!((N−kc )!)2((1− 2c )(N−k))!
N !
((N
c
)!)2((1− 2
c
)N)!
∼ cN
2πk(N − k)√1− 2/c ,
which is bounded by O(c/k) since k ≤ N/2 and c ≥ 4. Thus, the sum T≤k/2c/
(N
k
)
is bounded by
O(c/k) = O(
√
c/k). From the above, we obtain γ(N, k, c)/
(N
k
)
= O(
√
c/k).
Now Lemma 4 implies the desired bound Ω((k/d)1/4) by Eq.(1), and hence the proof of Theo-
rem 2 is completed.
On the contrary, we can show that any algorithm that uses only “small pans” also needs Ω(k1/4)
queries (Theorem 5). For instance, we cannot break the current bound k1/4 by any algorithm that
places O(N/k) coins on the pans. (Notice that the pan includes only a constant number of false
coins with high probability in this case and therefore we can achieve a better success probability
for the even false-coin case, but at the same time, we cannot use a wide range of superpositions).
Moreover, we can obtain another lower bound for the case where “big pans” and “small pans” are
both available but “medium pans” are not (Theorem 6). Unfortunately one can see that there is
still a gap between the sizes of the big pans and small pans even for a weakest nontrivial (ω(1))
lower bound. See Appendix C for the details of these results.
3.3 Lower Bounds for the Quasi B-Oracle
Second, we show that our upper bound is tight under the random-partition property. Notice that
in this case, if the coins include an odd number of false ones, then the scale is always tilted, and if
the coins include an even number (=m) of false ones, the scale will be balanced with probability
1/
√
m. Thus in order to show a lower bound, we need to generalize the adversary method that
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works for such “stochastic” oracles: Now ζ(x; q) is a random variable and the stochastic version of
Ox, denoted by O˜x, is defined as (we should be careful not to lose its unitarity):
O˜x|q, a, z〉 =
√
Pr[ζ(x; q) = 0]|q, a, z〉+ (−1)a
√
Pr[ζ(x; q) = 1]|q, a⊕ 1, z〉.
Now Lemma 3 changes to the following:
Lemma 5 Let w,w′ denote a weight scheme as Lemma 3 except replacing Condition 2 to
2’ Every triple (x, y, q) ∈ S × S × Q is assigned a nonnegative weight w′(x, y, q) that satisfies
w′(x, y, q) = 0 whenever Pr[ζ(x; q) = ζ(y; q)] = 1 or f(x) = f(y), and w′(x, y, q)w′(y, x, q) ≥
w2(x, y) for all x, y, q such that Pr[ζ(x; q) 6= ζ(y; q)] > 0 and f(x) 6= f(y).
Then, the quantum query complexity of f is at least
Ω
max
w,w′
min
x,y,q: w(x,y)>0,
Pr[ζ(x;q)6=ζ(y;q)]>0
√
µ(x)µ(y)
ν(x, q)ν(y, q)
1√
P01,q +
√
P10,q
 ,
where Pab,q = Pr[ζ(x; q) = a]Pr[ζ(y; q) = b].
Proof. The proof follows that of [20, Theorem 14] essentially; in the following we mainly describe
the difference. Assume that there is a T -query quantum algorithm A computing f with high
probability. Note that the initial state of A is |ψ0x〉 = |0〉 for any input x. The final state for input
x can be written as |ψTx 〉 = UT−1O˜x · · ·U1O˜xU0|0〉 for some unitary transformations U0, . . . , UT−1.
Since A computes f with high probability, there is some constant ǫ < 1 such that |〈ψTx |ψTy 〉| ≤ ǫ
for any x and y with f(x) 6= f(y). Let |ψkx〉 = Uk−1O˜x · · ·U1O˜xU0|0〉. For any x and y with
f(x) 6= f(y), we can represent
|ψk−1x 〉 =
∑
q,a,z
αq,a,z|q, a, z〉, |ψk−1y 〉 =
∑
q,a,z
βq,a,z|q, a, z〉.
After querying to the oracle, we have
O˜x|ψk−1x 〉 =
∑
q,a,z
αq,a,z(
√
Pr[ζ(x; q) = 0]|q, a, z〉 + (−1)a
√
Pr[ζ(x; q) = 1]|q, a⊕ 1, z〉)
=
∑
q,a,z
(
√
Pr[ζ(x; q) = 0]αq,a,z + (−1)a⊕1
√
Pr[ζ(x; q) = 1]αq,a⊕1,z)|q, a, z〉,
O˜y|ψk−1y 〉 =
∑
q,a,z
(
√
Pr[ζ(y; q) = 0]βq,a,z + (−1)a⊕1
√
Pr[ζ(y; q) = 1]βq,a⊕1,z)|q, a, z〉.
Hence we have (recall that Pab,q := Pr[ζ(x; q) = a]Pr[ζ(y; q) = b]):
〈ψkx|ψky 〉 =
∑
q,a,z
√
P00,qα
∗
q,a,zβq,a,z +
∑
q,a,z
√
P11,qα
∗
q,a⊕1,zβq,a⊕1,z
+
∑
q,a,z
(−1)a⊕1√P01,qα∗q,a,zβq,a⊕1,z +∑
q,a,z
(−1)a⊕1√P10,qα∗q,a⊕1,zβq,a,z
=
∑
q,a,z
√
P00,qα
∗
q,a,zβq,a,z +
∑
q,a,z
√
P11,qα
∗
q,a,zβq,a,z
+
∑
q,a,z
(−1)a⊕1√P01,qα∗q,a,zβq,a⊕1,z +∑
q,a,z
(−1)a√P10,qα∗q,a,zβq,a⊕1,z.
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On the contrary,
〈ψk−1x |ψk−1y 〉 =
∑
q,a,z
α∗q,a,zβq,a,z.
Thus the difference between 〈ψk−1x |ψk−1y 〉 and 〈ψkx|ψky 〉 is
〈ψk−1x |ψk−1y 〉 − 〈ψkx|ψky 〉 =
∑
q,a,z:Pr[ζ(x;q)6=ζ(y;q)]>0
[
(1−√P00,q −√P11,q)α∗q,a,zβq,a,z
+(−1)a(√P01,qα∗q,a,zβq,a⊕1,z −√P10,qα∗q,a,zβq,a⊕1,z)]
since Pr[ζ(x; q) = ζ(y; q)] = 1, that is, P00,q + P11,q = 1 implies that P00,q = 1 or P11,q = 1. By the
triangle inequality,
1− ǫ ≤ 1− |〈ψTx |ψTy 〉| ≤
T∑
k=1
|〈ψk−1x |ψk−1y 〉 − 〈ψkx|ψky 〉|
≤
T∑
k=1
∑
q,a,z
Pr[ζ(x;q)6=ζ(y;q)]>0
[
(1−√P00,q −√P11,q)|αq,a,z ||βq,a,z|+ (√P01,q +√P10,q)|αq,a,z||βq,a⊕1,z|]
≤
T∑
k=1
∑
q,a,z
Pr[ζ(x;q)6=ζ(y;q)]>0
[(
√
P01,q +
√
P10,q)(|αq,a,z||βq,a,z |+ |αq,a,z||βq,a⊕1,z|)].
The remaining part is completely similar to the proof of [20, Theorem 14]. Summing up the in-
equalities for all (x, y) ∈ S×S with weight w(x, y), we have (1−ǫ)∑x,y w(x, y) ≤ 2T 1√A∑x,y w(x, y)
where
A = min
x,y,q: w(x,y)>0
Pr[ζ(x;q)6=ζ(y;q)]>0
µ(x)µ(y)
ν(x, q)ν(y, q)
1
(
√
P01,q +
√
P10,q)2
.
Therefore, we obtain T = Ω(
√
A) and hence the proof is completed.
Now we define the stochastic version of our B-oracle by setting
Pr[ζ(x; q) = 0] =

0 (if wt(x ∧ q) is odd)√
1/wt(x ∧ q) (if wt(x ∧ q) is positive and even)
1 (if wt(x ∧ q) = 0),
where x and q are N -bit strings, and x ∧ q is the N -bit string obtained by the bitwise AND of
x and q. We call this oracle the quasi B-oracle and one can see that it simulates the B-oracle
with the random-partition property. Now we are ready to give the upper and lower bounds for
the query complexity of this quasi B-oracle. Assume that wt(x) = k. The upper bound is easy by
modifying Theorem 1 so that Step 2 in Find∗(k) can be replaced with O(k1/4) repetitions of the
quasi B-oracle.
Theorem 3 There is an O(k1/4)-query quantum algorithm to find x using the quasi B-oracle.
On the contrary, we can obtain the tight lower bound by using Lemma 5. The weight scheme
contrasts with that of Theorem 2; w(x, y) is nonzero only if the Hamming distance between x and
y is 2.
Theorem 4 Any quantum algorithm with the quasi B-oracle needs Ω(k1/4) queries to find x.
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Proof. First we define a weight scheme. Let S = {x ∈ {0, 1}N | wt(x) = k} and f(x) = x. In
what follows, we assume that wt(q) = l for the q that provides the minimum value of the formula
of Lemma 5 and show that the theorem holds for an arbitrary l ≤ N . For any (x, y) ∈ S × S, let
w(x, y) = 1 if d(x, y) = 2 and 0 otherwise. We must satisfy w′(x, y, q) = 0 for any different x, y
such that d(x, y) 6= 2 or Pr[ζ(x; q) = ζ(y; q)] = 1, which implies wt(x ∧ q) = wt(y ∧ q). Thus we
let w′(x, y, q) 6= 0 only if d(x, y) = 2 and wt(x ∧ q) = wt(y ∧ q)± 1. Define w′(x, y, q) as a function
of wt(x ∧ q) = m1 and wt(y ∧ q) = m2, and thus denote it by w′(x, y, q) = w′(m1,m2). Then
w′(m1,m2) is taken as
w′(m1,m2) =

2m(N−k−l+2m)
(l−2m+1)(k−2m+1) if (m1,m2) = (2m− 1, 2m)
(l−2m+1)(k−2m+1)
2m(N−k−l+2m) if (m1,m2) = (2m, 2m− 1)
1 if (m1,m2) = (2m, 2m+ 1), (2m + 1, 2m)
0 otherwise.
It can be easily seen that w,w′ is a weight scheme. Now we evaluate the lower bound under this
weight scheme. Clearly, µ(x) = µ(y) = k(N−k). For evaluating ν(x, q)ν(y, q), we consider only the
case where m1 = wt(x ∧ q) = 2m and m2 = wt(y ∧ q) = 2m− 1 (the other cases such as m1 = 2m
and m2 = 2m+ 1 can be similarly analyzed). In this case, we have
ν(x, q) = 2m(N − l − k + 2m)w′(2m, 2m − 1) + (k − 2m)(l − 2m)w′(2m, 2m+ 1)
≤ (l − 2m+ 1)(k − 2m+ 1) + (k − 2m)(l − 2m)
≤ 2(l − 2m+ 1)(k − 2m+ 1),
ν(y, q) = (2m− 1)(N − k − l + 2m− 1)w′(2m− 1, 2m− 2)
+ (k − 2m+ 1)(l − 2m+ 1)w′(2m− 1, 2m)
≤ (2m− 1)(N − k − l + 2m− 1) + 2m(N − k − l + 2m)
≤ 4m(N − k − l + 2m).
Note that since Pr[ζ(x; q) = 0] =
√
1/2m and Pr[ζ(y; q) = 1] = 1, P01,q = 1/
√
2m and P10,q = 0.
Thus we have
µ(x)µ(y)
ν(x, q)ν(y, q)
1
(
√
P01,q +
√
P10,q)2
=
k2(N − k)2√2m
8m(l − 2m+ 1)(k − 2m+ 1)(N − k − l + 2m) .
This value is bounded below by Ω(k1/2) since m ≤ k/2 and l ≤ N . Now Lemma 5 completes the
proof.
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A Efficient Construction of Transformation W
It can be easily seen that our algorithm Find∗(k) can be implemented in time polynomial in the
length of the input except for a bit nontrivial task, constructing the transformation W . Precisely,
W is a unitary transformation that satisfies W |x〉 = |ψx〉 := 1√
2N−1
∑
q˜∈Qeven(−1)q˜·x|q˜〉 for any
x ∈ S<N/2. We define a subset Slh of size 2N/2 as follows: Slh = S<N/2 if N is odd, or Slh =
S<N/2∪{x ∈ {0, 1}N/2 | lex(x) ≤ 2N/2/2} (where lex(x) is the lexicographic order of x in {0, 1}N/2)
if N is even. Notice that Slh is a polynomial-time computable set. Then the following algorithm
implements W .
Algorithm AW . Input: |x〉 such that wt(x) < N/2 in a register S.
1. Create the quantum state 1√
2
(|x〉+ |x¯〉) in S by Steps 1.1–1.3.
1.1. Prepare 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉) in a register R.
1.2. If the content of R is 1, flip all the N bits in S.
1.3. If the content of S is not in Slh, flip the bit in R.
2. Apply the Hadamard transform H on S.
3. Let S be the output.
It is easy to see that AW is implemented in polynomial time. By Step 1.1, we have
1√
2
|x〉S(|0〉+
|1〉)R. After Step 1.2, the state becomes 1√2(|x〉S|0〉R + |x¯〉S|1〉R). Step 1.3 transforms the state to
1√
2
(|x〉S|0〉R + |x¯〉S|0〉R) = 1√
2
(|x〉S + |x¯〉S)|0〉R.
Finally, the state after Step 2 is
H
(
1√
2
(|x〉S + |x¯〉S)
)
|0〉R = |ψx〉S|0〉R
as shown in the proof of Lemma 1.
B Algorithm Find(k)
The exact algorithm Find(k) is given as follows.
Algorithm Find(k). Let a (≥ 9/10) be the success probability of Find∗(k). Let B be the algorithm
that uses a single qubit with initial state |0〉 and rotates it to √1− 1/4a|0〉 +√1/4a|1〉. Notice
that the probability that Find∗(k) succeeds and B outputs |1〉 is exactly 1/4.
(i) Run Find∗(k) with initial state |0〉R in the register R and obtain a candidate of k false coins
X (in fact, the corresponding oracle), and also run B with initial state |0〉R′ in the register R′. Let
U be the unitary transformation done in this step (that is, the state after this step is U |0〉R|0〉R′).
(ii) Implement Steps (ii-1)–(ii-3) below.
(ii-1) Run algorithm Check, which will be described later, to check if X is indeed the set of
k false coins.
(ii-2) If Check outputs YES and B outputs |1〉, flip the phase. Otherwise, do nothing.
(ii-3) Reverse the operation of Step (ii-1).
(iii) Apply the reflection about the state U |0〉R|0〉R′ , i.e., I − 2U |0〉〈0|U †, where |0〉 = |0〉R|0〉R′ ,
to the state.
(iv) Measure R in the computational basis.
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By a geometric view (Theorem 4 in [6]) similar to the Grover search where the fraction of correct
solution(s) is 1/4 [5], we can verify that Find(k) succeeds with certainty. In Find(k), the “solution”
is |X〉R|1〉R′ where X is the k false coins. Notice that Step (ii) implements the transformation that
changes |X〉R|b〉R′ to −|X〉R|b〉R′ if (X, b) is the “solution” and |X〉R|b〉R′ otherwise. The total
complexity is the number of queries to run Find∗(k) and its inverse three times (once for Step (i)
and twice for Step (iii)) plus the number of queries to run Check and its inverse. So, we obtain a
query complexity of O(k1/4) if Check has a similar complexity.
In fact, Check needs only O(log k) queries, which is given as follows. For simplicity, we assume
that N is a multiple of k+1 and k+1 is a power of 2 but the generalization is easy. (Note that the
following algorithm satisfies the big-pan property. If we do not care the property, the algorithm
can be simplified a lot.)
Algorithm Check.
Input: Two subsets of a set X of N coins, X1 with size k and X1 = X \X1 with size N − k.
Output: YES iff the coins in X1 are all false and the coins in X1 are all fair.
1. Divide X1 into k + 1 equal-sized subsets Y1, Y2, . . . , Yk+1 (recall the above assumption).
2. Let L = Y1 and R = Y2. For i = 1 to log (k + 1), repeat Steps 2.1–2.2.
2.1. Check if L and R are balanced by Steps 2.1.1–2.1.3.
2.1.1. Construct arbitrarily two subsets L′ and R′ of size N/4 − |L| (= N/4 − |R|) from
X\(X1∪L∪R) (this is possible since |X\(X1∪L∪R)| ≥ N−k−|L|−|R| ≥ (N/4−|L|)+(N/4−|R|)).
2.1.2. Compare L ∪ L′ and R ∪R′ by a scale. If it is tilted, output NO.
2.1.3. Compare R ∪ L′ and L ∪R′ by a scale. If it is tilted, output NO.
2.2. Set L := L ∪R and R := ⋃2i+1j=2i+1 Yj .
3. Output YES.
Obviously, Check makes O(log k) queries. The correctness of Check can be seen as follows:
Observe that (i) if L′ and R′ are of different weight, at least one of Steps 2.1.2 and 2.1.3 is tilted,
and (ii) if L′ and R′ are of the same weight, then both of Steps 2.1.2 and 2.1.3 are balanced if and
only if L and R are of the same weight. Hence the algorithm essentially verifies if Y1 and Y2 are
of the same weight, Y1 ∪ Y2 and Y3 ∪ Y4 are of the same weight, Y1 ∪ · · · ∪ Y4 and Y5 ∪ · · · ∪ Y8 are
of the same weight, and so on. If all the tests go through, then Y1 through Yk+1 are all the same
weight, which cannot happen if X1 includes false coins since X1 includes at most k such ones.
Finally, we adapt our algorithm so that it can satisfy the big-pan property. We simulate the
transformation |q˜〉 7→ (−1)q˜·x|q˜〉 of the IP oracle by replacing a query string q˜ ∈ {0, 1}N with even
Hamming weight l by two queries with Hamming weight ⌊N/2⌋ when l/2 is even (similarly for
the case where it is odd). We replace q˜ by two N -bit strings q˜1 and q˜2 with Hamming weight l/2
such that q˜ = q˜1 ⊕ q˜2. We take an arbitrary N -bit string b˜ with wt(˜b) = ⌊N/2⌋ − l/2 such that
I (˜b) ∩ I(q˜) = ∅. Note that both q˜1 ⊕ b˜ and q˜2 ⊕ b˜ have Hamming weight ⌊N/2⌋. (Recall that the
Hamming weight of query strings must be even. So, if ⌊N/2⌋ is odd, then we need an adjustment
(−1) of the Hamming weight when selecting b˜.) Since (−1)(q˜1⊕b˜)·x(−1)(q˜2⊕b˜)·x = (−1)q˜·x for any x,
we can replace a query q˜ to the IP oracle by two queries q˜1 ⊕ b˜ and q˜2 ⊕ b˜. Thus, we can simulate
Find∗(k) without changing the complexity (up to a constant factor).
C Other Lower Bounds for Restricted Pans
In addition to Theorem 2, we can show more lower bounds for the case where the size of pans is
restricted. In what follows, L ≤ l denotes the restriction that at most l coins must be placed on
the pans whenever the balance is used.
First, we give a lower bound for the case where the size of pans is “small.” Note that Theorem
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5 implies that there is no o(k1/4)-query algorithm placing at most O(N/
√
k) coins on the pans
whenever the balance is used.
Theorem 5 If L ≤ l, then we need Ω(√kN/lmin(k, l)) weighings. In particular, we need Ω(√N/l)
weighings.
Proof. For simplicity, the following weight scheme is given when the size of each pan is l (that is,
when q ∈ Ql). But the same bound is also obtained similarly when the size is at most l, and hence
we can apply Lemma 3 for Q =
⋃
l′≤lQl′ to obtain the desired bound in the last of this proof. Let
S = {x ∈ {0, 1}N | wt(x) = k} and f(x) = x. For (x, y) ∈ S × S, let w(x, y) = 1 if d(x, y) = 2
(where d(x, y) denotes the Hamming distance between x and y) and 0 otherwise. When the query q
for x means that m1 and m2 false coins are placed on the left and right pans, respectively, and q for
y means that m3 and m4 false coins are placed on the left and right pans, respectively, we put the
same weight for all w′(x, y, q)’s of such triples (x, y, q), which is denoted as w′((m1,m2), (m3,m4)).
Then we define
w′((m1,m2), (m3,m4))
=

m(N−k−(2l−2m))
(l−m+1)(k−2m+1) if (m1,m2,m3,m4) = (m− 1,m,m,m), (m,m − 1,m,m),
(l−m+1)(k−2m+1)
m(N−k−(2l−2m)) if (m1,m2,m3,m4) = (m,m,m− 1,m), (m,m,m,m − 1),
1 if one of mi’s is m and the others are m− 1, or
(m1,m2,m3,m4) = (m+ 1,m− 1,m,m), (m − 1,m+ 1,m,m),
(m,m,m+ 1,m− 1), (m,m,m − 1,m+ 1),
0 otherwise,
where 1 ≤ m ≤ min(k/2, l). It is easy to see that the condition of a weight scheme is satisfied.
Notice that for any x ∈ S we have µ(x) = k(N − k). Evaluating ν(x, q) is a bit complicated. Since
this value depends on the numbers of false coins on the two pans, m1 and m2, represented by the
pair (x, q), we denote it by ν(m1,m2). We want to evaluate ν(x, q)ν(y, q) such that w(x, y) > 0, i.e.,
d(x, y) = 2 and χ(x; q) 6= χ(y; q). By symmetry, we can assume that χ(x; q) = 1 and χ(y; q) = 0.
Since d(x, y) = 2, we need to consider only the following cases: (i) ν(x, q) = ν(m,m − 1) (or
= ν(m− 1,m)) and ν(y, q) = ν(m,m) (where 0 < m ≤ min(k/2, l)); (ii) ν(x, q) = ν(m+ 1,m− 1)
(or = ν(m−1,m+1)) and ν(y, q) = ν(m,m) (where 0 < m < min(k/2, l)); (iii) ν(x, q) = ν(m+1,m)
(or = ν(m,m+ 1)) and ν(y, q) = ν(m,m) (where 0 ≤ m < min(k/2, l)). In case of (i),
ν(x, q) =
∑
y:d(x,y)=2, χ(y;q)=0
w′(x, y, q)
= w′((m,m− 1), (m− 1,m− 1))×m(N − k − (2l − (2m− 1)))
+w′((m,m− 1), (m,m)) × (l − (m− 1))(k − (2m− 1))
≤ 2m(N − k − 2l + 2m)
= O(min(k, l)N),
and
ν(y, q) =
∑
x:d(x,y)=2, χ(x;q)=1
w′(y, x, q)
= (w′((m,m), (m + 1,m)) + w′((m,m), (m,m + 1)))(l −m)(k − 2m)
+ (w′((m,m), (m,m − 1)) + w′((m,m), (m − 1,m)))m(N − k − (2l − 2m))
+ (w′((m,m), (m + 1,m− 1)) + w′((m,m), (m− 1,m+ 1)))m(l −m)
= 2(l −m)(k −m) + 2(l −m+ 1)(k − 2m+ 1)
= O(kl),
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and hence ν(x, q)ν(y, q) = O(kNlmin(k, l)). Similarly, in case of (iii), it holds that ν(x, q)ν(y, q) =
O(kNlmin(k, l)). In case of (ii),
ν(x, q) = w′((m+ 1,m− 1), (m,m)) × (l − (m− 1))(m + 1)
= (l −m+ 1)(m+ 1) = O(min(k/2, l)l) = O(min(k, l)N),
and ν(y, q) = O(kl), and hence we also have ν(x, q)ν(y, q) = O(kNlmin(k, l)). From the above, by
Lemma 3 the quantum query complexity is at least
Ω
 min
x,y,q: w(x,y)>0,
χ(x;q)6=χ(y;q)
√
µ(x)µ(y)
ν(x, q)ν(y, q)
 = Ω(
√
kN
lmin(k, l)
)
.
This completes the proof.
Second, we generalize Theorem 2 to the case where “big pans” and “small pans” are both
available but “medium pans” are not. Here, “L ≤ l1 or L ≥ l2” means that at most l1 coins or at
least l2 coins (or their superposition) must be placed on the pans whenever the balance is used.
Theorem 6 If L ≤ l1 or L ≥ l2 where l1 < l2, then we need Ω(min((N/l1k)1/2, (l2k/N)1/4))
weighings. In particular, for any ǫ ≥ 0, if L ≤ N/k1+2ǫ or L ≥ N/k1−4ǫ, then we need Ω(kǫ)
weighings.
Proof. We can use the same weight scheme as the proof of Theorem 2. Let l1 = N/d1 and
l2 = N/d2 with d1 > d2. The lower bound we should show is Ω(min((d1/k)
1/2, (k/d2)
1/4)). Similar
to the proof of Theorem 2, we can show that by Lemma 3 the quantum query complexity is at least
Ω
 minx,y,q
w(x,y)>0
χ(x;q)6=χ(y;q)
√
µ(x)µ(y)
ν(x, q)ν(y, q)
 = Ω
 min
c
c≥d1
or ≤d2
√√√√ (Nk )
γ(N, k, c)
·
(N
k
)(N
k
)− γ(N, k, c)
 . (4)
Then the theorem can be obtained from Eq.(4) by using Lemma 4 for c ≤ d2 and the following
lemma (Lemma 6) for c ≥ d1. (Notice that it suffices to show Lemma 6 for c ≥ 3 since the bound
we should obtain from Lemma 6, (d1/k)
1/2, is nontrivial only if d1 = ω(k) and hence the size of
pans N/c (≤ l1) should be considered only for c = ω(k)).
Lemma 6 (
(N
k
)− γ(N, k, c))/(Nk ) = O(kc ) for any c ≥ 3.
Proof. Let us bound the probability that the scale is tilted when N/c coins (N coins include k
false ones) are randomly placed on each of the two pans since it is exactly (
(N
k
)− γ(N, k, c))/(Nk ).
Clearly, this probability is upper bounded by the sum
∑k
m=1 t
′(m) where t′(m) :=
(km)(
N−k
2N/c−m)
( N2N/c)
denotes the probability of choosing exactly m false coins out of k ones when 2N/c coins are placed
on the pans. Letting r′(m) := t′(m+ 1)/t′(m) = (k−m)(2N/c−m)(m+1)(N−k−2N/c+m+1) , the sum is bounded by
k∑
m=1
t′(m) ≤ (r′(0) + r′(0)2 + · · · )t′(0) (since r′(0) ≥ r′(m) for all m ≥ 1)
≤ r
′(0)
1− r′(0) (by t
′(0) ≤ 1)
= O(r′(0)).
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Since c ≥ 3 and k ≤ N/2, we can see that the following holds:
r′(0) ≤ 2kN
cN − ck − 2N =
2k
c
· 1
1− kN − 2c
= O(k/c).
This completes the proof.
Hence the proof of Theorem 6 is completed.
Unfortunately, Theorem 6 does not give even a weakest nontrivial lower bound ω(1) if the size
of the pans is not restricted. One might have the hope by Theorem 6 that we could obtain a good
upper bound by always placing approximately N/k coins on the pans, but Theorem 5 denies such
a hope since we have an Ω(k1/2−2ǫ) lower bound for l = N/k1−4ǫ.
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